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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 1988, nine-year-old Jamie Swartz lost her mother to
cancer.' Unfortunately, this tragedy was only the beginning of her
problems.
In April of that year, when her mother underwent chemotherapy,
Jamie went to live with her father and stepmother in the Viewpointe
condominium complex in Margate, Florida.2 Viewpointe, however, was
an "adults-only" housing complex, with a charter forbidding families
with children from residing in the complex.' Although the by-laws
allowed exceptions from that adults-only policy, the condominium asso-
ciation's board members showed little sympathy for Jamie's plight.
In July 1988, the board voted to allow Jamie to reside in
Viewpointe until her mother completed chemotherapy.4 However, when
her mother died in September and it became clear that Jamie would be a
permanent resident of the complex, the board's attitude changed. Only
* Attorney in private practice. J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1997; B.A., John
Jay College of the City University of New York, 1992. This Article continues my long-standing
tradition of sentimental author's notes. My first thanks go, as always, to Professor Abraham
Abramovsky of Fordham University School of Law, whose encouragement and support for my
career and scholarship is selfless and continuing. I also wish to thank Professor Harold Lubell,
also of Fordham, who originally inspired me to write this Article. Honorable mention goes in
addition to the gang at the Corporation Counsel's office, who have offered nothing but support for
my spare-time scholarship. Finally, I would like to thank my first family-Martin, Sharon,
Deborah and Judith Edelstein-as well as my second family-Deborah, Bucky, Ari, Dov and
Aviva Abramovsky-for their skill at pretending interest whenever I waxed philosophical about
this topic and for their consideration in always having coffee waiting.
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days after her mother's death, the board voted to begin eviction proceed-
ings against her father if she was not out of Viewpointe by January 10,
1989. 5 In addition, the widespread social ostracism that Jamie had suf-
fered since moving into the complex worsened.6
Fortunately, Jamie Swartz's story has a happy ending. On March
12, 1989, the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (the "FHAA"),7
which sharply restricted housing discrimination against families with
children, went into effect.8 Jamie, whose father had declared his will-
ingness to fight the Viewpointe board's decision,9 was able to stay. 10
Congress enacted the FHAA to prevent discriminatory treatment
similar to that faced by the Swartzes. The growth of "adults-only"
apartments and condominiums in the 1970s and 1980s led to widespread
discrimination against families with children, to the point where many
families found it difficult to obtain housing. The FHAA was enacted in
response to this problem, and in an attempt to restore order to the con-
fused state of the law that had resulted from inconsistent judicial
decisions.
Many senior I activists opposed the FHAA, however, because they
feared it could endanger the integrity of the retirement communities,
which consisted disproportionately of mobile home parks and condo-
miniums, in which many seniors had chosen to live in the company of
fellow retirees. To allay these fears, the FHAA created three categories
of exemption that allowed certain seniors communities to discriminate
on the basis of age and family status. The broadest of these allows age-
based discrimination by housing communities that provide "significant
facilities and services" for the elderly, if at least eighty percent of the




7. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3602,
3604-3608, 3610-3619, 3631 (1944 & Supp. 1 1996)).
8. See Jennifer Jolly Ryan, A Real Estate Professional's and Attorney's Guide to the Fair
Housing Law's Recent Inclusion of Familial Status as a Protected Class, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1143, 1164 (1994-1995).
9. See Adults at Odds over a 9-Year-Old in a Florida Condiminium, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
1988, at A17.
10. See Ron Stodgill III et al., Adults-Only Housing Hears the Pitter-Patter of Little Feet,
Bus.WK., Mar. 13, 1989, at 39.
11. The term "senior(s)" is used herein as a general term to describe adults fifty-five years of
age and over. Other age classifications, such as "adults 62 and over," are specifically used as
necessary.
12. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(d)(2), 102 Stat.
1619, 1623 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C) (1994)). The term "55-and-over
housing" is used here as a general term for housing communities to which this exemption applies.
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According to its critics, however, the FHAA created at least as
many problems as it solved. The regulations crafted by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to implement the Act are
vaguely drawn and subject to frequent litigation. Furthermore, many
critics argue that the FHAA has inhibited the creation of new senior
communities due to the expense of meeting the exemption requirements
and the possibility of expensive litigation thereunder. Consequently, in
the fall of 1994, HUD held hearings to revise its regulations and to more
clearly define the "significant facilities and services" requirement.
1 3
Pursuant to these hearings, HUD issued a new set of regulations in
1995.14
HUD's attempted clarification, however, was pre-empted by legis-
lative action. In 1995, following the election of a Republican majority
in Congress, senior activists were able to secure passage of legislation
repealing many of the FHAA provisions they considered onerous. 15 The
Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995,16 among other things, elimi-
nated the controversial requirement that senior communities provide
"significant facilities and services" for the elderly.'"
The relaxation of the "significant facilities and services" require-
ment forced courts to strike a difficult balance. In enforcing the FHAA,
not only must courts give effect to the congressional intent of making it
easier to qualify for exemption under the statute, but they must also
avoid granting recognition to "communities of seniors united [only] by
their preference to not live around children." '18 In the first reported case
decided under the amended statute, a federal district court achieved this
delicate balance.
In Simovits v. Chanticleer Condominium Ass'n.,19 the Northern
District of Illinois construed the FHAA, as amended, by strictly apply-
ing the provisions of the Act as it existed prior to the amendments cre-
13. See Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 832-33 (9th Cir.), amended in
part by 125 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing the regulatory history of the FHAA).
14. See 60 Fed. Reg. 43,322, 43,327-30 (1995) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (proposed
July 31, 1995).
15. Carl A.S. Coan, Jr., and Sheila C. Salmon, The Fair Housing Act and Seniors' Housing,
27 URn. LAW. 826, 834-35 (1996) (stating that a proposed "Senior Citizens Equity Act," including
the Housing for Older Persons Act, was part of the Republican Party's 1994 contract with
America). It is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article to suggest why Republican legislators,
with their often-expressed commitment to "family values," have historically been willing to
sanction housing discrimination against families with children.
16. Pub. L. No. 104-76, 109 Stat. 787 (amending the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3631 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996).
17. See S. REP. No. 104-172, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N 778, 780.
18. S. REP. No. 104-172, at 13 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 779.
19. 933 F. Supp. 1394, 1401-03 (N.D. I11. 1996). See Part IV infra for a discussion of the
reasoning of the Simovits court.
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ated by the Housing for Older Persons Act.20 Due to an expedited
discovery process and expedited trial before a magistrate judge, Simovits
is likely two to three years ahead of any subsequent decision construing
the Housing for Older Persons Act.21 Furthermore, as the Simovits deci-
sion was not appealed,2 2 it is that much further ahead of any other final
decision regarding this statute. Consequently, the Simovits decision
charts a course for courts to follow when faced with federal fair housing
litigation.
This Article examines the potential effect of the Housing for Older
Persons Act on the legal status of senior communities and families with
children. Part II examines the crisis in family housing that led to pas-
sage of the FHAA, as well as the legal environment that existed in state
and federal jurisdictions prior to 1988. Part III outlines the age and fam-
ily-status provisions of the FHAA, and examines significant cases in
which courts have attempted to define "significant facilities and serv-
ices." Part IV outlines the legislative history and provisions of the
Housing for Older Persons Act, and attempts to determine whether it Act
will ease the availability of senior housing or, as some critics have
argued, make it easier for adult communities to discriminate against
families with children. Part V discusses the Simovits decision, its
grounding in congressional intent and prior judicial decisions, and its
implications for future fair housing litigation. In Part VI, recommenda-
tions are made regarding state legislation and means by which those
states that still require senior communities to provide "significant facili-
ties and services" might protect those communities from potentially
crippling liability, without eliminating the requirement entirely.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE FAIR HOUSING
AMENDMENTS ACT
During the 1970s and 1980s, the shortage of housing for families
with children reached crisis proportions.23 A significant portion of this
crisis was caused by the proliferation of adult mobile home parks and
condominium housing complexes, 24 many of which-unlike private
20. Id. at 1401-03.
21. See Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Lynn Taren, Attorney for Plaintiffs in Simovits v.
Chanticleer Condominium Ass'n (May 29, 1997). Due to the congested calendars of federal
courts and administrative tribunals adjudicating fair housing disputes, decisions often are not
rendered until three to five years after the complaint is filed. See id.
22. See id.
23. For an excellent discussion of the causes and symptoms of housing discrimination against
families with children prior to the FHAA, see Robert A. Bilott, Note, The Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988: A Promising First Step Toward the Elimination of Familial
Homelessness?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1275, 1277-83 (1989).
24. The number of occupied condominium units in the United States nearly doubled during
[Vol. 52:947
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homes-contained restrictive covenants or by-laws discriminating
against families with children or residents under a certain age.
The magnitude of this problem is evidenced by a nationwide study
of housing discrimination prepared by HUD in 1980, in which 80,000
units were surveyed.25 This study reported that twenty-five percent of
housing providers excluded children completely, while an additional
fifty percent imposed age restrictions.26 Other studies conducted during
the 1980s in various parts of the United States confirmed the conclusion
that discrimination against families with children was widespread. 7 For
the most part, state and federal courts were deferential to adults-only
housing complexes. For instance, one Florida appellate court permitted
enforcement of a deed restriction prohibiting residents under the age of
sixteen, against a couple who had recently had a baby.28 Prior to enact-
ment of the FHAA, only fifteen states and the District of Columbia had
laws prohibiting discrimination against families with children.2 9 More-
the 1980s, from 1,707,807 to 3,204,000. See Lewis A. Schiller, Limitations on the Enforceability
of Condominium Rules, 22 STETSON L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1993). Condominium housing is
attractive to senior citizens, presumably because of the affordability of condominium units as well
as the greater ease of providing senior services and amenities in a condominium setting. In
addition, states that have historically been attractive to retirees, including Florida, Arizona, and
California, also contain greater concentrations of condominium housing. At the time of passage
of the FHAA, Florida was second only to Hawaii in the number of condominium dwellers. See
Adults at Odds over 9-Year-Old in a Florida Condominium, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1988, at A17.
Age-restricted condominiums also flourished during the 1980s in Arizona and California, as well
as Connecticut and New Jersey. See Andree Brooks, Condos Face Loss of Control, N.Y. TtMES,
Dec. 2, 1990, at 7.
25. See ROBERT W. MARANS ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, MEASURING
RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES AFFECTING FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN: A NATIONAL SURVEY
(1980).
26. See id. at 24. During the debate concerning the Fair Housing Amendments Act, Senator
Domenici cited these figures in support of his claim were two million Americans were denied
their choice of housing due to discrimination. See 134 CONG. Rc. S 10,544, S 10,553 (daily ed.
Aug. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
27. See, e.g., MARIN HOUSING CENTER, CHILD DISCRIMINATION AUDIT REPORT: A REPORT
BY THE FAIR HOUSING PROGRAM OF MARIN COUNTY (1986) (indicating that 63% of housing
complexes in Marin County preferred families without children); R. BURKE, A REPORT ON
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN IN DES MOINES RENTAL HOUSING (1985) (indicating that
48% of rental housing in Des Moines excluded families with children); Kristin Downey, Housing
Bill Slams Door on Adult-Only Apartments, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1988, at Al (reporting that
93% of rental housing in Alexandria had some restrictions on occupancy by children, with 20%
banning children outright).
28. See Pomerantz v. Woodlands Section 8 Ass'n, 479 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). The
Pomerantz court relied on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in White Egret Condominium v.
Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979), holding that an age restriction did not trigger strict scrutiny
but instead gave rise to a two-part test requiring a court to determine whether the restriction was
reasonable under the circumstances of the case and whether it was unduly oppressive. See 479 So.
2d at 794. The Pomerantz case is also interesting because expert testimony was admitted to
support the homeowners' association's contention that seniors benefit from living exclusively in
the company of other seniors. See id. at 795.
29. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.2
1998]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
over, a number of these statutes contained exceptions which essentially
vitiated the anti-discrimination provisions, such as blanket exceptions
for any housing community that declared itself to be "adult housing"3
and exceptions for "'retirement' [housing] with abnormally low
entrance ages. '31 In nine of these sixteen jurisdictions, the anti-discrimi-
nation statutes applied only to rental housing.32 Additionally, violation
of these statutes was often punishable by a fine of less than $100, 33 a
trivial expense for many housing providers. The weakness of these laws
was cited by Congress as a key reason for passage of the FHAA.34
Even in the absence of protective legislation, some courts attempted
to fashion rationales for preventing discrimination against families with
children. Challenges to age discrimination in housing proved most suc-
cessful when the victim could show that race as well as age discrimina-
tion had occurred.35 In 1982, however, the Ninth Circuit ruled that,
where state action is involved, adults-only policies infringe upon a fun-
damental right and trigger strict scrutiny analysis even in the absence of
racial discrimination. 36 The obvious deficiency in this decision is that,
since most housing is privately owned, no state action is implicated by
sale or rental restrictions. Thus, despite its hopeful language, this deci-
sion provided little relief to families facing discrimination by private
developers or landlords.
Some courts, however, have been willing to go further. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court led the way among states without family-protec-
(Deering 1990 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64a (West 1986) (repealed 1990);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (1989) (repealed 1996); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-104
(West 1989) (repealed 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6027 (West 1988) (repealed 1989);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(11) (West 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2502
(West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2)(1) (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:42-101 (West 1987); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 236-37 (McKinney 1989); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 34-37-4 (1995 & Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503(a) (1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-88 (Michie 1984) (repealed 1991).
30. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317(B) (West 1990) (amended 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 34-37-4(E)(5)(e) (1995 & Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-88 (Michie 1984) (repealed 1991).
31. Bilott, supra note 23, at 1282 (citing MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 37.2503(1)(c) (West
1985 & Supp. 1997)). The Michigan statute provides an exemption for retirement communities
designed for persons fifty years of age or older. See id. at 1282 n.62.
32. See Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11 th Cir. 1992) (citing
H.REP. No. 100-711, at 19 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2180).
33. See Bilott, supra note 23, at 1282, n.65.
34. Hearings on H.R. 1158, 100th Cong. 394, 402 (1988) (statement of James Morales).
35. See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984). In Betsey, the
Fourth Circuit held that Turtle Creek's conversion to adults-only housing, resulting in a higher
eviction rate for minority families, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
impact, and that Turtle Creek would have to meet the business necessity standard to overcome the
showing of discrimination. See id. at 988.
36. See Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982).
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tion laws in O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n.37 O'Connor, a
case of first impression in California, provoked vigorous and heated dis-
cussion within the judiciary. In fact, the three decisions of the two
appellate Courts in that case provide an excellent example of the reason-
ing of both sides on the family-protection issue.
Plaintiffs John and Denise O'Connor resided in Village Green, a
Los Angeles condominium that limited residency to persons over eight-
een years of age.38 The O'Connors, who had a minor son, filed suit in
Los Angeles County Superior Court to invalidate and enjoin enforce-
ment of this restriction; the condominium association countersued to
enjoin the O'Connors from residing in their unit with their son.39 The
trial court dismissed the O'Connors' suit and granted a preliminary
injunction to the condominium board.n
The O'Connors appealed both decisions to the California Court of
Appeals for the Second District. After deciding that state civil rights
law did not prohibit age discrimination in housing,41 the appellate court
stated the following:
[E]ach owner [of a condominium] must necessarily surrender a cer-
tain amount of freedom of action to the regulatory authority of the
other owners as a group....
... [P]ersons who purchase condominiums and thus surrender their
own freedom of action have the right to rely on the fact that the other
owners will be similarly restricted.4 2
The Second District Court of Appeals further held that condomin-
ium associations could reasonably "impose regulations to prevent activi-
ties that might be annoying or disturbing to the entire group of
occupants. 43 Children, said the court, can be "greatly disturbing to
those not... favorably disposed. Those ... individuals have the right,
by lawful means, to insulate themselves from such disturbance .... 44
The court accordingly affirmed the trial court's decision.
The California Supreme Court, however, reversed.45 California's
37. 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983) (en banc).
38. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 177 Cal. Rptr. 159, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981),
vacated, 183 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), vacated, 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983) (en banc).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 161-62. The court compared the laws governing employment and housing
discrimination to support its conclusion that "the Legislature [intended] to exclude age as a
protected class in housing . I..." Id  at 161.
42. Id. at 163 (citations omitted).
43. Id. citing Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978)).
44. Id.
45. See O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 431 (Cal. 1983) (en banc).
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highest court found that age restrictions in condominium housing violate
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.46 In granting the O'Connors' peti-
tion to invalidate Village Green's regulation, the court held that condo-
miniums are business establishments and thus subject to the provisions
of the Unruh Civil Rights Act governing discrimination by businesses.47
The ruling that condominium associations are businesses brought
the O'Connor case squarely in line with a prior California civil rights
decision. In Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 8 the California Supreme
Court ruled the previous year that the business provisions of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act prohibit age discrimination by owners of rental hous-
ing.49 In O'Connor, the court extended the application of Marina Point
to condominium associations. °
In 1984, California's Unruh Civil Rights Act was amended to
incorporate the reasoning underlying the O'Connor and Marina Point
decisions.5 However, California courts later retreated from the sweep-
ing prohibition against age discrimination provided by O'Connor. In
1987, after Chief Justice Bird and two other liberal justices were not re-
elected, the newly-right-leaning California Supreme Court refused to
grant certiorari in a case in which an appellate court had ruled that a
condominium association could lawfully exclude children from an
adults-only section of the complex. In contravention of at least the
spirit of O'Connor, California Court of Appeals Sunrise Country Club
Ass'n. v. Proud,53 had ruled that families with children could be rele-
46. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (Deering 1990 & Supp. 1998).
47. See O'Connor, 662 P.2d at 431. The court reasoned:
Contrary to the association's attempt to characterize itself as but an organization that
"mows lawns" for owners, the association in reality has a far broader and more
businesslike purpose. The association ... is charged with employing a professional
property management firm, with obtaining insurance for the benefit of all owners
and with maintaining and repairing all common areas and facilities of the 629-unit
project. It is also charged with establishing and collecting assessments from all
owners to pay for its undertakings and with adopting and enforcing rules and
regulations for the common good. In brief, the association performs all the
customary business functions which in the traditional landlord-tenant relationship
rest on the landlord's shoulders.
Id.
48. 640 P.2d 115, 116 (Cal. 1982) (en banc).
49. Id. at 116.
50. See O'Connor, 662 P.2d at 431.
51. See Act of Aug. 28, 1984, ch. 787, 1984 Cal. Laws 2780 (creating CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 51.2); Act of Sept. 25, 1984, ch. 1333, § 1, 1984 Cal. Laws 4681, 4681-82 (creating CAL. Civ.
CODE § 51.3). Chapter 787 specifically stated that section 51.2 was being added to clarify the
California Supreme Court's decisions in O'Connor and Marina Park. See § 1, 1984 Cal. Laws at
2781.
52. See Sunrise Country Club Ass'n v. Proud, 190 Cal. App. 3d 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987),
review denied (June 3, 1987).
53. Id. at 377.
[Vol. 52:947
FAMILY VALUES: PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION
gated to specific areas of a condominium complex in which a reasonable
number of units and recreational facilities were provided for them.54
The Sunrise Court distinguished O'Connor and Marina Point on the
basis that those cases involved situations in which families with children
were completely and absolutely banned, whereas in the case at bar over
one-half of the living units and swimming pools were set aside for fam-
ily use.55
In another case decided the same year, the California Supreme
Court also declined to extend the protection of the Unruh Civil Rights
Act to mobile home parks.56 In ruling that mobile home parks were
permitted to restrict occupancy to adults, California's highest court
stated that "the solution [to the problem of finding affordable housing
for children] lies with the legislature, not the courts."57
III. THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988:
A PROBLEMATIC SOLUTION
This judicial inconsistency, combined with the rising affordable-
housing crisis of the 1980s, fueled support for just such a legislative
solution. The solution came in the form of the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act, introduced in companion bills by Representatives Fish and
Edwards in the House and Senators Kenndey and Specter in the Sen-
ate.58 Among its provisions, the FHAA banned discrimination based on
familial status in the rental or sale of housing.59 It also prohibited
assignment of families with children to "family ghettos" similar to those
allowed by the California courts in Sunrise.6 °
The FHAA also provided "teeth," both in terms of enforcement
methods and penalties, that the Fair Housing Act had not previously
possessed. 61 In addition to allowing aggrieved persons to file com-
plaints with the Secretary of HUD62 and outlining procedures for the
adjudication of these complaints, the FHAA allows enforcement by the
Attorney General in federal court63 and by aggrieved persons in federal
54. Id. at 382.
55. See id. at 382.
56. See Schmidt v. Superior Court, 742 P.2d 209, 212-13 (Cal. 1987), vacated, 769 P.2d 932
(Cal. 1989).
57. Id. at 217.
58. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2175.
59. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(b)(1)-(2), 102 Stat.
1619, 1622 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(e), 3606 (1994).
60. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c)(4) (1997).
61. See Edward Allen, Six Years After Passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act:
Discrimination Against Families with Children, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 297, 299 (Summer 1995).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1994).
63. See id. § 3614. This provision allows the Attorney General to commence a civil
19981
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or state courts. 6 4 Additionally, administrative law judges hearing cases
under the FHAA are authorized to impose punitive damages "to vindi-
cate the public interest" of up to $10,000 if the offending housing pro-
vider has not been adjudged to have committed previous discriminatory
housing practices, and as much as $50,000 if the housing provider has
been adjudged to have committed two or more discriminatory housing
practices during the seven years prior to the filing of the charge.65
Moreover, the FHAA lengthened the statute of limitations for private
enforcement of the act from 180 days to two years.66
Despite bipartisan sponsorship of the FHAA, opposition was fierce,
especially among advocates for seniors. They argued that "seniors
deserved the freedom of choice and even the serenity that they thought
only a child-free environment could provide. 67 Seniors who had cho-
sen to live in adult communities, they argued, should not be forced to
live with the possibly disturbing and disruptive presence of young
children.68
To allay these concerns, provisions were included in the FHAA to
allow three categories of senior housing to discriminate on the basis of
age or familial status. This "housing for older persons" under the FHAA
includes housing built under state or federal programs to assist the eld-
erly,69 housing intended for and solely occupied by persons sixty-two
years of age or older,70 and a general category of senior housing
intended for occupancy by adults fifty-five years of age or older. 1 This
last category grants the widest exemption, and has also caused the great-
est number of problems.
In order to qualify for the fifty-five-and-over exemption under the
FHAA, housing complexes formerely were required to provide "signifi-
proceeding against any person or housing provider in cases where there is "reasonable cause to
believe that [such person or persons] is engaged in a pattern or practice" of housing discrimination
in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Id. § 3614(a). The trial court in such actions can impose
civil penalties of up to $50,000 for a first offense, and up to $100,000 for subsequent offenses.
See id. § 3614(d)(1)(C).
64. See id. § 3613.
65. See id. § 3612(g)(3).
66. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 39 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2200.
67. Allen, supra note 61, at 301-02.
68. See Ryan, supra note 8, at 1164 ("The exemption for 'housing for older persons' was
included in the FHAA in recognition of the impact the amendments would have on elderly
residents who had bought or rented homes with the expectation that they would be able to live
without the noise and hazards of children.") (citing 134 CONG. REc. H6499-6500 (daily ed. Aug.
8, 1988) (statement of Rep. Fish)).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(A) (1994).
70. See id. § 3607(b)(2)(B).
71. See id. § 3607(b)(2)(C).
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cant facilities and services" to the elderly.72 Additionally, at least eighty
percent of occupied units had to be inhabited by at least one person fifty-
five years of age or older.73 Qualifying housing complexes were also
required to demonstrate an intent to serve the senior community by pub-
lishing and adhering to policies and procedures consistent with the Fair
Housing Act,74 and to comply with HUD rules regarding verification of
occupancy.75
Despite these exemptions, senior organizations were quick to
mount legal challenges to the FHAA. Within four years of its the enact-
ment, in a challenge to the familial status provisions reached the Elev-
enth Circuit in Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp.7 6 In that case, a
Florida seniors organization and two residents of a condominium which
faced apotential loss of its adults-only status77 claimed that the FHAA
violated their constitutional right to freedom of association, right to pri-
vacy, a deprivation of their property interests and violated their due pro-
cess rights, and also violated the Tenth Amendment guarantee against
encroachments upon state sovereignty. 78  The Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded, however, that these were "five meritless arguments. 79
In Seniors, the court first considered the contention that the FHAA
violated the Tenth Amendment by infringing on Florida's sovereignty.
The Eleventh Circuit found the necessary authority under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, 80 recognizing that courts must defer to Con-
gress if a rational basis exists for Congress' determination that an activ-
ity affects interstate commerce.81 The court stated that the national
housing market affects interstate commerce, and that Congress had a
rational basis for amending the Fair Housing Act due to a desire to rem-
edy the nationwide crisis caused by housing discrimination against fami-
lies with children.
82
72. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(d)(2), 102 Stat.
1619, 1623 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(i) (Sep. 13, 1994).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. 1 1996).
74. See id. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(i); see also 134 CONG. REc. 510,456 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988)
(statements of Sens. Kennedy and Specter) ("[T]he housing in question must, in its marketing to
the public and in its internal operations, hold itself out as housing for persons age 55 or older.").
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(iii) (Supp. 1 1996).
76. 965 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1992).
77. The Clearwater Point Condominium complex, an adults-only complex in Florida, failed to
meet the standards for qualified senior housing under 42 U.S.C. § 3607 as amended by the Fair
Housing Amendments Act. See id. at 1033.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1036.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress authority to regulate interstate
commerce).
81. See Seniors, 965 F.2d at 1034 (citing Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)).
82. See id. at 1034.
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The plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim of violation of due process
was likewise quickly disposed of by the Eleventh Circuit, which noted
that "the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to
establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way. "83 The court noted that the FHAA contains specific provisions
allowing qualified seniors housing to discriminate on the basis of age or
familial status, and concluded that Congress' action was neither irra-
tional nor arbitrary.84
The fact that the FHAA provides exemptions for qualified seniors
housing was also cited by the court in considering the plaintiffs' claim
that the FHAA "discriminated" against elderly people who wished to
live away from children.85 The Eleventh Circuit then considered what it
termed the "most meritless" argument advanced by the plaintiffs, that
the FHAA infringed upon their freedom of association and right to pri-
vacy.86 In a stinging rebuke to the Seniors Civil Liberties Association
and the individual plaintiffs, the court stated that "[w]hatever the penum-
bral right to privacy found in the Constitution might include, it excludes
without question the right to dictate or to challenge whether families
with children may move in next door to you."'87 Finally, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the FHAA was not unconstitutionally vague, holding
that it was not "so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or stan-
dard at all."88
Whatever the constitutional status of the FHAA may be, the practi-
cal difficulties raised thereby have been considerable. At the time the
FHAA was proposed, many housing complex owners and managers
worried that it would be expensive or impractical to meet the standards
set for qualified senior housing. In Florida, for example, less than
twenty-five percent of adults-only condominiums qualified under any of
83. Id. at 1035 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
84. See id. ("If Congress had not also acted to protect the rights of persons situated similarly
to the [plaintiffs]-that is, older, potentially more vulnerable home owners and renters-perhaps
plaintiffs' argument that the 1988 amendments were arbitrary and irrational might have some
strength.").
85. See id. at 1035-36 (stating that the senior housing exemptions "are reasonable and rational
in the light of a legitimate governmental purpose-curing familial status discrimination-[and
therefore] the Act violates no due process rights of the [plaintiffs]." (For similar reasons, the court
determined that the plaintiffs' right to freedom of association was not violated by the FHAA,
noting that "if plaintiffs followed the exemption guidelines, they would lawfully be able to restrict
occupancy based on age to an even greater degree than is the case in the condominium complex
now." Id at 1036.
86. See id.
87. Id. "[T]he Act violates no privacy rights because it stops at the [plaintiffs'] front door."
Id.
88. Id. (quoting Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967)).
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the exemptions set forth in the FHAA.89 Many condominium associa-
tions seeking to retain their adults-only status worried that the wording
of their by-laws concerning age restrictions might prove inadequate
under the FHAA, and many feared it would be difficult to muster the
approval of two-thirds of the unit owners that is frequently required for a
by-law change.9° Some condominium board members were also con-
cerned about the possibility of being personally sued for damages under
the FHAA. 91
Some critics of the FHAA claimed that the built-in enforcement
provisions would be difficult to administer and would result in HUD
administrative law courts being overburdened with age and familial sta-
tus discrimination cases. 92 In fact, by the time the FHAA went into
effect on March 12, 1989, about 12,800 familial discrimination com-
plaints had already been filed.93 During the first two years after the
FHAA was implemented, about half of all HUD complaints alleged
familial status discrimination; in 1992 and 1993, about twenty-six per-
cent of HUD cases involved familial status discrimination.94
The majority of familial status cases brought under the FHAA
involve two clauses of the statute: the provision requiring owners or
managers of fifty-five-and-over housing to publish and adhere to proce-
dures demonstrating their intent to provide qualified senior housing,95
and the clause requiring such housing to provide "significant facilities
and services" for the elderly. 96 The regulations promulgated by HUD in
1989 providing guidelines for measuring intent to comply with the
FHAA by publishing and adhering to procedures were straightforward
and specific, 97 but HUD has been reluctant to find housing providers in
89. See Brooks, supra note 24.
90. See id.
91. See id. Being sued personally could be particularly burdensome because some
condominium associations do not insure or indemnify board members for liability arising out of
actions taken in their capacities as members of the board. See id.
92. See Allen, supra note 61, at 302.
93. See id. at 303.
94. See id. By early 1994, as many as two-thirds of the cases in which HUD found
reasonable cause to afind discrimination were family status cases. See id.
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. 1 1996).
96. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(d)(2), 102 Stat.
1619, 1623 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(i) (1994).
97. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.304(c)(2) (1989). This regulation enumerated six factors to be
considered in determining whether a housing provider met the standards of 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607(b)(2)(C)(ii): (1) the manner in which the housing facility was described to prospective
residents; (2) the nature of advertising designed to attract prospective tenants; (3) age verification
procedures; (4) lease provisions; (5) written rules and regulations; and (6) the actual practices of
the owner or manager in enforcing lease or sale provisions and rules. See id. Although the
regulation refers to "the owner or manager," a homeowner's association may qualify for
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compliance. 98
In Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass 'n,99 the Eleventh
Circuit considered whether a 529-unit housing complex in Florida had
complied with the requirement that it publish and adhere to procedures
demonstrating its intent to provide senior housing. 100 At issue in Mas-
saro was a declaration of restrictions providing that "use of all the lots
. . . [be] limited to permanent residents sixteen (16) years of age and
older." 10' Pursuant to this restriction, in the fall of 1989, the association
threatened action against the Massaros if they refused to remove their
infant son from their home. 0 2 The Massaros filed a complaint against
the association in federal court and an administrative complaint with
HUD. A few months later, the association voted to amend its by-laws to
restrict occupancy to adults fifty-five years of age and over. 10 3 The
association thereafter notified another couple that the presence of their
infant daughter in their home was a violation of the age restriction.' 0
4
This second couple also filed a complaint against the association with
HUD, which was ultimately consolidated with the Massaros' pending
federal court action.
0 5
In a rare ruling in favor of an adults-only community, the trial court
found that the homeowners' association had met all the statutory
requirements for the fifty-five-and-over housing exemption.10 6  The
Eleventh Circuit considered only whether the policies and procedures
published and adhered to by the association at the time of the two
couples' complaints were sufficient to qualify the complex as fifty-five-
and-over housing under the FHAA. In assessing the policy in existence
at the time of the Massaros' complaint, the court found that the restric-
exemption under the FHAA if it performs functions of an owner or manager. See Massaro v.
Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n, 3 F.3d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir. 1993).
98. See, e.g., HUD v. Nelson Mobile Home Park, No. 04-91-0040-1, 1993 WL 498882, at *1,
*9-10 (H.U.D.A.L.J. Dec. 2, 1993) (finding that the written regulations, description to prospective
residents, and age verification procedures evidenced an intent to exclude children under 18 rather
than to provide housing for persons 55 and over); HUD v. Murphy, Nos. 02-89-0202-1, 02-89-
0203-1, 02-89-0204-1, 02-89-0205-01, 02-89-0206-1, 02-89-0209-1, 02-89-0212-1, 02-89-0213-
1, 02-89-0243-1, 1990 WL 456962, at *1, *40 (H.U.D.A.L.J. July 13, 1990) (finding that a single
billboard advertising an adults-only community did not meet the requirement).
99. 3 F.3d 1472 (11 th Cir. 1993).
100. Id. at 1474.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1474-75.
103. See id. at 1475.
104. See id.
105. See id. HUD investigated the two complaints and issued a final determination of familial
status discrimination. The case was then referred to the Justice Department, which filed an action
in federal court against the association. The Justice Department suit was consolidated with the
Massaros' pending action. See id.
106. See id. at 1474.
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tion against residency by persons sixteen years of age or under was
insufficient to establish an intent to provide senior housing. 10 7 The
Eleventh Circuit also held that restriction on occupancy by residents
under fifty-five years of age, as contained in the amended by-laws, was
not sufficient by itself to satisfy the requirements of the statute. The
court specifically noted that the association had only enforced the age
restriction against couples with children, rather than indiscriminately
across the board. 1
08
While not expressly ruling on the validity of the association's
amended by-laws and policies, the court held that the complex did not
qualify for the fifty-five-and-over exemption at the time of its actions
against the two couples. 109 The major impact of Massaro, however,
came in the court's approach to construing the FHAA exemptions. In a
holding which has had profound implications on subsequent fair housing
litigation, the Massaro court held that the exemptions contained in the
FHAA "are to be narrowly construed to enforce the goals of the Act."'
1 0°
Thus, the test for satisfying the "policies and procedures" require-
ment of the FHAA has been well established since Massaro. The "sig-
nificant facilities and services" requirement, however, has proven
considerably more problematic. The FHAA granted HUD the power to
promulgate regulations enforcing this requirement;"1 I however, the regu-
lation HUD promulgated in 1989112 was widely criticized for vagueness
and has been the subject of frequent litigation.
In HUD v. Nelson Mobile Home Park,"3 an administrative law
judge considered the case of an adults-only mobile home park in Florida.
Although it claimed to meet the "significant facilities and services"
requirement, the mobile home park provided few amenities for the eld-
erly, including a clubhouse, petanque court, sporadic social events, and
assistance in contacting the county "Meals on Wheels" program.114 The
107. See id. at 1479.
108. See id. at 1479-81. The court noted that there was no age screening of prospective
purchasers prior to their settlement in the community, that the association had made no attempt to
evict residents under fifty-five years of age other than those with children, and that the secretary of
the association considered the age restriction unenforceable. See id. at 1481.
109. See id. at 1482.
110. Id. at 1480 (citing Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 979 (11 th Cir. 1992)).
111. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 6(d)(2), 102 Stat. 1619,
1623 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § (1994)).
112. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.304(b)(1) (1995). This regulation, which was repealed in 1995,
provided several categories of services and programs that could be considered "significant
facilities and services," but failed to specify any particular services or to provide guidance as to
how many services a senior community must provide in order to qualify, stating merely that such
housing facilities "need not have all of these features." See id.
113. No. 04-91-0040-1, 1993 WL 498882, at *1 (H.U.D.A.L.J. Dec. 2, 1993).
114. See id. at *6.
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judge concluded that these services and facilities were insufficient to
meet the "significant facilities and services" requirement. In reaching
this conclusion, the judge specifically noted the lack of recreational
facilities, educational programs, and informational services.' 15
The administrative judge next considered the mobile home park's
contention that providing "significant facilities and services" for the eld-
erly was impracticable and that it was therefore entitled to an exemption
from that requirement under the HUD regulations.116 The judge con-
cluded that the park had failed to satisfy any of the factors specified in
the regulation and that, moreover, the park had failed to provide reliable
proof that eighty percent of the mobile homes in the park were occupied
by persons fifty-five years of age or older.11 7 In short, the judge con-
cluded that the park "demonstrated a commitment to excluding children
but not a commitment to promoting itself as housing for older
persons.""1 8
Other decisions have evidenced a similar reluctance to find that the
amenities provided meet the "significant facilities and services" test. 9
For example, in HUD v. Ocean Parks Condominium Ass'n,1 ° a HUD
administrative law judge considered complaints brought against a luxury
condominium in Florida by a man who had custody of his young daugh-
115. See id.; see also Rogers v. Windmill Pointe Village Club Ass'n, 967 F.2d 525, 528 (11 th
Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (requirement not met where pool and tennis courts were not adapted to
accommodate the needs of seniors and many housing units were not equipped to be physically
accessible to older persons); United States v. Keck, Civ. A. No. C89-1664-C, 1990 WL 357064, at
*1, 3, 5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 1990) (requirement not satisfied by "routine park maintenance, a
laundry room, cable TV, occasional distribution of a newsletter to tenants, weekly posting of items
in or near the laundry room, and occasional advice and information provided on an ad hoc basis to
tenants who inquire regarding transportation, local services, food programs and other matters").
116. The relevant regulation provided that housing complexes might qualify for the 55-and-
over exemption if it was "not practicable" to provide significant facilities and services and if it
proved that the provision of such services would "depriv[e] older persons in the relevant
geographic area of needed and desired housing." 24 C.F.R. § 100.304(b)(2) (1995). The
regulation provided seven factors to be considered in determining whether housing complexes
qualified under this clause: (1) whether the owner or manager of the housing complex has made a
bona fide effort to provide the necessary services; (2) the amount of rent charged or the sale price
of the units; (3) the income range of the residents of the housing facility; (4) the demand for
housing for older persons in the relevant geographic area; (5) the range of housing choices for
older persons in the relevant geographic area; (6) the availability of similarly-priced housing for
older persons in the relevant geographic area; and (7) the vacancy rate of the housing facility. See
id. § 100.304(b)(2)(i)-(vii). Demonstrating that the provision of significant services and facilities
is expensive is insufficient to show impracticability under the regulation. See id.
§ 100.304(b)(2)(i).
117. See Nelson, 1993 WL 498882, at *7-9.
118. Id. at *11.
119. Id. at *2-3.
120. Nos. 04-90-0589-1, 04-90-0604-1, 1993 WL 316543, at *1, 2, 3 (H.U.D.A.L.J. Aug. 20,
1993).
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ter and an older couple with grandchildren."' In applying the "signifi-
cant facilities and services" test, the judge noted that the complex did
not employ an activities director, that resident-coordinated activities
were sporadically attended, and that individual units were not accessible
by wheelchair. 2' Proximity to outside services and stores was also
found to be insufficient, as the condominium did not provide transporta-
tion for its residents and the outside services were accessible only by
gravel paths that were not lit at night." 3 Furthermore, the condominium
association did not provide services designed specifically for the elderly.
The mere existence of a clubhouse and generic recreational facilities was
insufficient to meet the test because the facilities were not fashioned
primarily for older persons.
1 24
Similarly, in Lanier v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 25 a federal dis-
trict judge found that facilities not designed specifically for use by
seniors did not meet the statutory test.1 26 The Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Winters1 27 also applied this standard, affirming the trial court's
determination that a condominium's luxurious amenities were not spe-
cifically designed for the elderly and that the complex therefore did not
qualify as fifty-five-and-over housing under the statute.
1 28
The confusion created by the "significant facilities and services"
test and the difficult hurdle it posed for senior housing providers led to
demands for clarification by HUD. Responding to these demands, Con-
gress issued a mandate to HUD in 1992 to promulgate more definite
rules outlining this requirement.1 29 In response, HUD published a pro-
posed rule in July 1994 clarifying the meaning of "significant facilities
and services."' 10 However, overwhelming public disapproval forced
121. See Andrea D. Panjwani, Beyond the Beltway: The Housing for Older Persons Act of
1995, J. Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L., Spring 1996, at 197, 198 (stating that senior
communities rarely prevailed in litigation under the Fair Housing Amendments Act).
122. See id. at *12, 32.
123. See id. at *12.
124. See id. at *31.
125. 776 F. Supp. 1533, 1535-37 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
126. Id. at 1535-37.
127. Nos. 93-2278, 94-2025, 1994 WL 582419, at *1, 38 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 1994)
(unpublished table decision).
128. Id.
129. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 919, 121,
106 Stat. 3672, 3883. Congress enacted this legislation as a result of its dissatisfaction with the
"continuing failure of [HUD] to issue timely regulations and [because of] HUD's refusal to
implement enacted provisions." See H.R. REP. No. 102-760, at 73 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3281, 3353. Among the provisions of this act was a directive to HUD to "make
rules defining what are 'significant facilities and services especially designed to meet the...
needs of older persons' ...." § 919,106 Stat. at 3883.
130. See 59 Fed. Reg. 34,902 (1994) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (proposed July 7,
1994).
1998]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
HUD to withdraw this rule later that year.' 3 1
Following the debacle of the July 1994 proposal, HUD held nation-
wide hearings in the fall of 1994, culminating in the promulgation of a
revised set of regulations on August 18, 1995.132 These regulations
defined "significant facilities and services" in greater detail, stating that
a housing facility qualified if it provided at least two services or pro-
grams in at least five of twelve specific categories.1 33 The regulations
also provided a detailed guideline for determining whether facilities and
services were sufficiently available to community residents to qualify
under the statute, 134 and provided a self-certification provision by which
senior communities could certify compliance with the regulation by
completing a short checklist.
135
IV. THE HOUSING FOR OLDER PERSONS ACT OF 1995:
Too MUCH SIMPLIFICATION?
The 1995 HUD regulations, however, never took effect. 1 36  A
movement to eliminate the "significant facilities and services" require-
ment had been building for some time, spurred on by the perception that
the requirement set an impossibly high hurdle. Even as HUD revised its
regulations to achieve greater clarity, this movement achieved its goal.
At the heart of this movement was the view that statutory compli-
ance was prohibitively expensive and that courts had set an impossibly
high standard for qualifying for the fifty-five-and-over exemption. Crit-
ics of the FHAA pointed out that HUD and the courts had allowed very
131. See 59 Fed. Reg. 64,104 (1994).
132. See 60 Fed. Reg. 43,322, 43,327-30 (1995) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100 (proposed
July 31, 1995).
133. See id. at 43,328-29. The 12 categories delineated included social and recreational
services, continuing education activities, information and counseling services, homemaker
services, outside maintenance health and safety services, emergency and preventive health care
programs, community dining, transportation to outside social services, services designed to
encourage residents to use available facilities, social and recreational facilities, accessible physical
environment, and other facilities specifically designed to meet the needs of the elderly. Each
category except the last included a list of a number of specific activities, programs, or facilities
qualifying as services for the elderly. See id.
134. See id. at 43,329.
135. See id. at 43,329-30, 43-332-33.
136. These regulations might nevertheless ultimately have more than historical interest. At
least one federal court has found that the Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995 does not apply
retroactively. See Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 839 (9th Cir. 1997),
amended in part by 125 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, a pattern of discrimination that occurred
in the three-month period between promulgation of the 1995 HUD regulations and passage of the
Housing for Older Persons Act would conceivably fall within the scope of the regulations. The
1995 regulations are also of continuing usefulness as indicators of intent to provide housing for
adults fifty-five years of age and over. See infra text accompanying notes 191-92.
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few senior housing communities exempt status, 137 and that the statutory
requirements were so nebulous and vaguely worded that courts and
HUD could interpret them in any way they chose.138
Opponents further contended that the "significant facilities and
services" requirement discriminated against low-income senior citizens
by imposing prohibitively expensive compliance standards, thus raising
the price of senior housing beyond what many low-income seniors could
afford. 13 9 This complaint was particularly common among owners and
managers of mobile home parks, which generally provided the fewest
amenities for the least affluent tenants.140 Other opponents of the FHAA
opined that the "significant facilities and services" requirement was
patronizing in that it attempted to impose services on seniors that they
might not need or want, in other words, that the federal government was
telling seniors how to live.
1 41
These arguments had dubious merit, however, especially in light of
the 1995 regulations, which defined the statautory requirements much
more explicitly and set clear compliance standards. Furthermore, com-
pliance need not be prohibitively expensive. Despite opponents' charac-
137. See Allen, supra note 61, at 317 (reporting that only two trial court decisions have ever
granted a fifty-five-and-over exemption to housing providers, and that one of those was reversed
on appeal); see also S. Rep. No. 104-172, at 9 )1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 785-
86 (quoting an Orlando Sentinel article in which it was reported that "lawyers could not find a
single instance in which a senior community was able to defend successfully against a challenge
to its exempt status").
138. See S. REP. No. 104-172, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 781 (Nov. 9,
1995) ("The ... requirement has been a disaster since the housing for older persons exemption
was passed as an exception to the general rule prohibiting discrimination against families with
children in 1988. Nobody, indcluding the Government, can figure out what the phrase 'significant
facilities and services' means."); see id. at 11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 787 (referring to
"significant anecdotal evidence of rather arbitrary decisions by fair housing investigators"); 141
CONG. REC. S18,063, S18,064 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Sen. Brown) (contending that
"the way bureaucrats have administered [the significant facilities and services requirement] would
make the people who came up with the Mississippi literacy test proud").
139. See S. REP. No. 104-172, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 781-82; see
also 141 CONG. REC. S18,063, S18,065 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Sen. Brown) ("The
problem [was] that the seniors housing exemption could only be allowed for facilities that were
designed for the very wealthy. So we have a circumstance where, if you followed the existing
HUD regulations, the rich could enjoy the exemption but the normal seniors could not.").
140. See, e.g., Fair Housing and Exemptions for the Elderly: Hearings on H.R. 660 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Kristian Jensen, CEO, Jensen's Inc.) available in
1995 WL 460655. Jensen, who was the owner of twenty-six family-managed mobile home parks
in 7 states, of which twenty-two were reserved for persons fifty-five or over, testified that, "[t]he
facilities and services requirements can increase the cost of housing for seniors who are often on
fixed incomes .... The cost of facilities and services must be passed on in the form of lease or
association fees to residents in these communities." Id.
141. See S. REp. No. 104-172, at 9 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 785
("[Seniors] don't want or need to be told by the federal government how to live.").
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terization of the 1995 HUD regulations as "federal bingo mandates,"' 42
most of the programs and services on the HUD list were basic amenities
for senior populations. 143 In short, the existence or non-existence of
such facilities and services provided an effective way to determine
whether an adult development was in fact designed to provide comfort
to seniors or whether it was merely intended to exclude children.
Furthermore, compliance with the HUD regulations would not nec-
essarily have been prohibitively expensive for developers. These regula-
tions did not prevent housing providers from passing along to residents
the cost of compliance. In addition, many renovations necessary to
comply with other statutes, such as those mandating handicapped-acces-
sible facilities, could also be used to comply with the regulations.
144
Finally, the "significant facilities and services" requirement could be
waived in cases in which a senior community could demonstrate a press-
ing need for senior housing in its immediate area.145
Nevertheless, the movement to eliminate the "significant facilities
and services" requirement proceeded, leading to the introduction of the
Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995 in the House of Representatives.
In addition to eliminating the "significant facilities and services"
requirement, 146 that act also created a "good-faith defense" protecting
those senior communities that sought in good faith to comply with the
statutory requirements without being liable for monetary damages.147
Critics of the proposed act were quick to argue that outright elimi-
nation of the "significant facilities and services" requirement was too
drastic a step. Some, in fact, contended that the Housing for Older Per-
142. See id.
143. For example, a community could comply under the 1995 regulations by providing the
following 10 facilities or services: referrals to housecleaning services, a tool loan service, security
guards, meals on wheels, the presence of a doctor within two miles of the facility, monthly blood
pressure checks, a community room, a television room with a community VCR, ramps (curbs cut
to allow wheelchair access), and a handicapped-accessible management office. See 60 Fed. Reg.
43,322, 43,328-29 (1995) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.306(c)-(d)). It would be difficult to
argue that providing these services would be prohibitively expensive even for a moderate-income
senior community.
144. See id. at 43,329 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.306(d)(11)) (including in the list of
qualifying facilities and services "accessible physical environment" facilities including benches,
ramps, accessible management offices, and accessible public bathrooms).
145. See id. at 43,330 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.310).
146. See S. Rep. No. 104-172, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 780.
147. See Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-76, § 3, 109 Stat. 787, 787-
88 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(5) (Supp. 11996)). Housing providers may only
show good faith by showing that they have no actual knowledge that the housing community in
question does not comply with the statute and that they have stated formally, in writing, that the
community complies with the exemption rquirements. See id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607(b)(5)(B) (Supp. 1 1996)). For further discussion of the legislative history and purpose of
the good faith defense, see Panjwani, supra note 121, at 200.
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sons Act would in effect amount to a rollback of the FHAA.14 8 These
critics argued that the proposed act would not only reverse seven years
of progress in curtailing discrimination based on familial status, but
would also endanger the unique character of retirement communities
that had grown up since passage of the FHAA. 14 9
In other words, many of the communities that would thereafater be
eligible for designation as "senior communities" would lack the ameni-
ties that characterize a community designed specifically for seniors, and
would offer the senior population nothing more than a child-free envi-
ronment.1 50 Not only would families with children suffer as a result of
the ease with which communities not specifically designed for seniors
could designate themselves to be age-restricted developments, but
seniors would also be harmed by the economically-driven tendency of
builders to offer only the minimum level of services necessary to comply
with the statutory requirements. In short, the proposed legislation was
seen as having the potential to reduce the level of available services and
facilities at all senior communities to that of mobile home parks. This
was a dual mistake in the eyes of the act's opponents, who contended
that "if you're going to be able to discriminate against families, you
should be special-and you should be serving the special needs of
seniors." 5'
148. See, e.g., Fair Housing and Exemptions for the Elderly: Hearings on H.R. 660 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Stuart Ishimaru, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice) available in 1995 WL 469531 ("Enactment of [the Housing for Older Persons Act] would
weaken anti-discrimination protection based on familial status, and would allow the very
proliferation of 'all-adult' housing facilities the [Fair Housing Amendments Act] sought to
proscribe.").
149. See id.
150. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 518,063, 518,068 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Biden) ("What we were not concerned about [when the FHAA was enacted] is a community for
the elderly with special needs where they needed ramps, where they needed special dining
facilities, where there was some type of extended care, where it was in fact designed for elderly
persons ... , [and the FHAA was not enacted] just because all of a sudden we [had] become trendy
and decided that kids are kind of in the way."). See also id. (contending that, under the proposed
act, a housing community does "not have to be a senior facility. [It] can just not like kids. [It] can
just not like kids around.". Opponents of the proposed act also contended that:
[T]he elimination of the significanat facilities and services provisions ... subverts
the justification for allowing certain seniors communities to discriminate against
families with children. That is, that the exception is necessary in order to facilitate
senior's [sic] ability to live in environments that are... "tailored to their specific
needs." In other words, the requirement was intended to ensure that housing
communities claiming this exemption were indeed legitimate retirement
communities designed to meet the specific needs of senior citizens [and] not just
communities of seniors united by their preference to not live around children.
S. REP. No. 104-172, at 13 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 789.
151. See S. REp. No. 104-172, at 15 (1995) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 791. In
addition, Sens. Paul Simon, Edward F. Kennedy, and Russell Feingold, although they voted in
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"Children's advocacy groups, however, were "no match for the
well-funded seniors' lobby. 152 The Housing for Older Persons Act of
1995 passed in both houses with only token opposition, 153 and became
law on December 28, 1995.114 On April 1, 1996, HUD promulgated
new regulations reflecting the elimination of the "significant facilities
and services" requirement from the statute.1 55
V. APPLYING THE HOUSING FOR OLDER PERSONS ACT: A DISTRICT
COURT TAKES A PRO-FAMILY STANCE
Although at least one federal court has determined that the Housing
for Older Persons Act of 1995 does not apply retroactively, 156 only one
reported state or federal decision has thus far construed the substantive
provisions of the act. In Simovits v. Chanticleer Condominium Ass'n,1
57
the court took a resoundingly pro-family stance, holding that the 1995
amendments to the Fair Housing Act did not preclude the court from
strictly construing the remaining requirements of the FHAA. 158  In so
doing, the Simovits court signalled that, despite the predictions of certain
commentators, 59 the federal judiciary retains the power to combat dis-
crimination if it has the will to do so.
Simovits was not a remarkably difficult test case. Stephen and
Kathleen Simovits owned a condominium in the Chanticleer Condomin-
ium Complex, an eighty-four-unit facility located in Hinsdale, Illi-
favor of the proposed statute, expressed their intention to "monitor" the effects of the Housing for
Older Persons Act with an eye to repeal if discrimination increased. See Panjwani, supra note
121, at 200-01.
152. Allen, supra note 61, at 319.
153. On November 19, 1995, the House of Representatives passed the proposed act by an
overwhelming 424-5 vote. The Senate passed the act, as amended, on December 6, 1995, by a
vote of 94-3. See 141 CONG. REC. S18,063, S18,070 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995). On December 18,
1995, the House concurred in the Senate amendment in a non-roll-call vote. See 141 CONG. REc.
H14,966, H14,972 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1995).
154. See Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. § 104-76, 109 Stat. 787 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C), (5) (Supp. 1 1996)).
155. See 61 Fed. Reg. 14,378 (1996) (removing 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.305, .306, .307, .310, .315,
.316, including the "significant facilities and services" checklist certification).
156. See Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 839 (9th Cir.), amended in
part by 125 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997). In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that "nothing in
the language or history of the [act] indicates that Congress intended it to apply to cases predating
its enactment" and that retroactivity was disfavored because "applying the [act] would
substantially alter the legal rights and obligations of both housing providers and residents." Id. at
839. The court also found that retroactive application would conflict with the general federal
savings statute, I U.S.C. § 109 (1994), which provides that a change in statutory law does not
extinguish any pre-existing liability incurred under a prior statute. See id.
157. 933 F. Supp. 1394, 1402 (N.D. 11. 1996).
158. Id. at 1402.
159. Cf, e.g., Allen, supra note 61, at 311 (contending that pro-family precedent might be
irrelevant since the enactment of the Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995).
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nois.16° In 1985, the condominium association had adopted a restrictive
covenant which provided that "'no minor children under the age of
eighteen (18) years may reside in any unit purchased after the effective
date of this amendment' without the prior written approval of the Board
of Managers." '161 Although many residents were over the age of fifty-
five years, there was no requirement to that effect. 162 In fact, the associ-
ation president described the complex as "intended for people who are
'any age over 18,' "163 and units had been sold to persons under fifty-
five.' 64
The roots of Simovits began in 1993, when the plaintiffs purchased
their condominium for $130,000.165 Prior to the closing, the restrictive
covenant was explained to them. Although Mr. Simovits informed the
association board that he believed the covenant was illegal, the plaintiffs
signed a statement agreeing to abide by its restrictions.1 66 Until the
plaintiffs attempted to sell their apartment, nothing further came of their
objection to the restrictive covenant.
In May 1995, the plaintiffs put their condominium up for sale, at
the initial asking price of $187,500.167 A prospective buyer expressed
interest in the condominium; however, the plaintiffs decided not to nego-
tiate with her "because she had a minor child and they did not wish to
cause any problems."1 68 Subsequently, due to a lack of interested buy-
ers, they were forced to lower their asking price twice, reducing it by
almost $20,000. 169
In early November, another buyer expressed interest in the condo-
minium. This time, the prospective buyer was the parent of three minor
children. 17° The plaintiffs informed the president of the association that
they had a potential buyer with minor children.1 7' The president
reminded them and their realtor of the covenant forbidding sales to fami-
lies with children under eighteen, following which the prospective buyer
160. See Simovits 933 F. Supp. at 1397.
161. Id. Residents violating this covenant were subject, by the terms of their ownership
agreement, to injunctive relief and a $10,000. See id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. See id. The last two sales of Chanticleer units prior to the trial in the case were to persons
under the age of fifty-five. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. Mr. Simovits testified at trial that his lawyer told him that, "despite his belief
regarding the illegality of the Covenant, he had to sign this statement in order to finalize the
closing on the condominium." Id. at 1397 n.3.
167. See id. at 1397.
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 1397, 1398.
171. See id.
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decided not to make an offer. 7 2 On November 8, 1995, counsel for the
association called the plaintiffs and warned them again that they were
prohibited from selling to persons with minor children. 73
The association's attorney had a somewhat different message for
the board. In a letter to the association, he opined that "the statutory
exemptions to the [Fair Housing Act] are 'strictly construed'" and that
the restrictive covenant was of "questionable legality."' 174 In a meeting
held on November 14, however, the board decided to continue to pre-
vent the plaintiffs from selling to a buyer with minor children.
17 5
The association prepared for litigation by conducting an informal
survey of condominium residents in order to determine the percentage
who were fifty-five years of age or older. 176 However, "in compiling the
survey, [the association president] speculated as to the residents' ages
... [and] did not take any steps to verify these presumptions."'' 77 In a
second survey taken in May 1996, in preparation for a hearing, the presi-
dent obtained affidavits verifying the ages of some residents, but he
"resorted to guessing the ages of those residents who did not submit an
affidavit."'
178
In the meantime, on April 15, 1996, the plaintiffs entered into a
contract to sell their apartment for $145,000 to a childless couple.
179
Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed suit in federal court under the Fair
Housing Act, alleging that the restriction had denied them "numerous
opportunities to sell their condominium at a higher price."' 80 They were
joined in their lawsuit by a non-profit fair housing agency.' 8 '
The parties agreed to expedited discovery and trial, and the case
was tried less than six weeks after the plaintiffs had filed suit.' 82 Thus,
the Simovits case provided a remarkably early first opportunity to
examine the Housing for Older Persons Act. Because the allegedly dis-
criminatory conduct continued beyond the enactment of the 1995
amendments to the Fair Housing Act and the subsequent HUD regula-
tions, the issue of retroactivity was not raised, and the amended statute







179. See id. Ironically, the association agreed to waive the covenant for these prospective
buyers, who were young and wished to start a family. See id. It is unclear why the association
was unwilling to take such a step earlier.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 1394, 1398.
182. A bench trial was held before Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys on May 23 and 24, 1996.
See id. at 1396, 1397 n.l.
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was applied.1 83
The association's argument rested upon a single slender reed. It
admitted that it had never published or adhered to policies or procedures
demonstrating an intent to provide housing to persons fifty-five years of
age or older.1 84 Further, the association failed to implement age verifi-
cation procedures prior to being sued.1 85 In short, by failing to comply
with the HUD regulations,' 86 the association "ha[d], in fact, conceded its
liability under the Fair Housing Act."' 87
In an effort to avoid "conced[ing] its liability," the association
argued that by enacting the Housing for Older Persons Act, Congress
intended that the 1995 regulations would no longer apply. In response
to this argument, the Simovits court quoted the admonition of Massaro
that "exemptions from the Fair Housing Act are to be construed nar-
rowly, in recognition of the important goal of preventing housing dis-
crimination." 18  In effect, the association argued that Congress intended
to go beyond the plain language of the Housing for Older Persons Act
and provide a liberal exemption for adults-only communities regardless
of their intent to provide senior housing.
The court disagreed.189 In rejecting the association's argument,
however, the court went beyond the holding that would necessarily dis-
pose of this relatively easy case. Rather, the court went a step further
and reaffirmed the principles of Massaro, setting the stage for strict
application of the remaining statutory requirements in future familial
discrimination cases. 190 The court stated that "[c]learly, only the provi-
sions relating to the 'significant facilities and services requirement' were
deleted" by the 1995 amendments. 9 The court further stated that Con-
gress' purpose was specifically and narrowly "to eliminate the burden of
the 'significant facilities and services' requirement,"'' 92 and that "noth-
ing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended the policies
and procedures prong to change. '
183. See id. at 1401 n.15.
184. See id. at 1402.
185. See id. at 1403.
186. See 60 Fed. Reg. 43,322, 43,330 (1995) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.316(b)(1)-(6)).
187. Simovits, 933 F. Supp. at 1402; see also Rogers v. Windmill Pointe Village Club Ass'n,
967 F.2d 525, 527-28 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that occupancy may not be
established by testimony alone or by mere survey without further information as to its methods
and validity).
188. Simovits, 933 F. Supp. at 1402 n.18 (quoting Massaro, 3 F.3d at 1475).
189. See id. at 1402.
190. See id. at 1402 n.18.
191. Id. at 1402.
192. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 104-172, at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 778, 779).
193. Id. The court noted that "the statutory language describing the [policies and procedures]
test in the amended statute is exactly the same as it was in the old statute." Id.
1998]
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Thus, the court concluded that "because the policies and procedures
prong remains entirely unchanged, so do the criteria for analyzing it."' 9 4
Based on this principle, and on the standards previously articulated by
HUD and by the Eleventh Circuit in Massaro, the court found that the
absence of an explicit rule or regulation restricting occupancy to persons
fifty-five years of age or older and the failure to verify the ages of the
condominium residents placed the covenant outside the exemption pro-
vided by the Fair Housing Act.'95 Significantly, the court found the
association's argument that it was "in effective compliance" with the fair
housing law unpersuasive in light of the principles set forth in Mas-
saro.'9 6 Compliance with the Fair Housing Act, said the court, was to
be measured just as strictly as it had been prior to the 1995 amendments,
with the removal of the "significant facilities and services" requirement
as the only relaxation.
Thus, despite the somewhat unsympathetic plaintiffs in Simovits, 19 7
the court converted a straightforward case into a powerful statement
against discrimination. Of course, it remains to be seen whether
Simovits will be followed by other courts, and what ultimate effect the
Housing for Older Persons Act will have on the availability of housing
for families with children. Simovits suggests that there may be little
real-world effect; however, another appellate court has opined that the
amendments effected by the Housing for Older Persons Act "substan-
tially alter the legal rights and obligations of both housing providers and
residents." 198 Regardless of whether the remaining statutory require-
ments are strictly construed, it is clear that the 1995 amendments
removed a significant hurdle to obtaining the fifty-five-and-over exemp-
tion. At the same time, however, communities qualifying for exemption
as a result of these amendments may in fact lack many of the amenities
that seniors have come to expect. Moreover, the elimination of the "sig-
nificant facilities and services" requirement removes a safeguard-how-
ever controversial and often litigated-that has proven important over
194. Id.
195. See id. at 1403.
196. See id. at 1402 n.18. "The Association's argument for 'effective compliance' directly
conflicts with [Massaro's] principle of narrow construction." Id.
197. The association asserted laches and unclean hands as defenses to the complaint, on the
grounds that the plaintiffs had not challenged the covenant until they put their apartment up for
sale and that Mr. Simovits had earlier run for a position on the association board on a platform
indicating support for the covenant. See id. at 1397, 1404-05.
198. Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 839 (9th Cir.), amended in part
by 125 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Panjwani, supra note 121, at 201 (stating that the
Housing for Older Persons Act might lead to an increase in the number of adults-only
communities which qualify for the 55-and-under exception because developments in which less
than 50 percent of the population is over 55 years of age may qualify under the new baseline
standard).
[Vol. 52:947
FAMILY VALUES: PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION
the last nine years in preventing discrimination against families with
children.
VI. CONCLUSION
The substantial difficulties in obtaining and retaining senior com-
munity status under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 led to a
change in the statute. By eliminating the "significant facilities and serv-
ices" requirement, however, the Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995
may have gone too far. The arguments put forth by critics of the 1995
act, combined with evidence that housing discrimination against families
with children continues to pervade society,' 99 are sufficient to raise real-
istic concerns that the Housing for Older Persons Act may result in
increased discrimination against children. Furthermore, many housing
complexes that would qualify for exempt status under the act might be
senior communities in name only, with few or no amenities designed to
fulfill the needs of elderly residents.
Simovits shows a commitment by at least one federal court to go as
far as possible, within the current law, to protect families against invidi-
ous discrimination by realtors and developers. If this commitment is to
be perpetuated throughout the nation, however, both federal and state
officials must pursue additional measures to preserve the rights of fami-
lies with children while simultaneously accommodating the needs of
seniors.
At the federal level, it seems unlikely that Congress will repeal the
Housing for Older Persons Act or reinstate the requirement for "signifi-
cant facilities and services." As the Simovits court pointed out, however,
the requirement of demonstrating an intent to provide specialized hous-
ing for seniors was not eliminated by the 1995 act.20° With this in mind,
there is nothing preventing courts from continuing to consider the avail-
ability of such services in determining whether housing providers in fact
demonstrate the requisite intent to serve adults fifty-five and over, which
is necessary to obtain exemption from the anti-discrimination provisions
of the Fair Housing Act. One federal court, in fact, has done exactly
that, although it dealt with a claim that accrued before the 1995
amendments.2 °
Courts should also follow Simovits by applying strict standards to
199. See Allen, supra note 61, at 303-04 (citing various statistics including a 1992 housing
discrimination audit in Oakland reporting that 68% of housing providers continued to discriminate
against families with children despite the Fair Housing Amendments Act).
200. See Simovits, 933 F. Supp. at 1401-03.
201. See Tropics Residents Club v. California Tropics Investors 1992, No. C-95-3979 MHP,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14292, at *1, *32 n.17 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 1997).
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determine whether seniors communities "publish and adhere to policies
and procedures" as required to obtain the fifty-five-and-over exemption.
With the availability of the good-faith defense provided by the Housing
for Older Persons Act to shield well-meaning senior communities from
costly monetary damages, courts can easily justify a requirement of
strict statutory compliance in order to protect families with children.
At the state level, many jurisdictions continue to require senior
communities to provide "significant facilities and services" to their resi-
dents in order to qualify for exempt status under state anti-discrimination
laws.2 °2 These states should not be as quick to amend their statutes to
conform to federal law as they have been in the past.2°3 Federal law
202. As of this writing, 21 states have "significant facilities and services" requirements. See
ALA. CODE § 24-8-3(7)(c)(1) (Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-502(7)(b)(I) (West
1990 & Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4602(15)(c)(1) (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 8-3-
205(b)(1)(C)(i) (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9.5-3-4(c)(1) (West Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 216.12(4)(a) (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1018(c)(2)(A) (1993); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 51:2605(C)(1)(a) (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN .§ 363.02(2)(2)(b)(iii)(A) (West Supp.
1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.040(9)(3)(a) (West 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-322(4)(b)(iii)(A)
(1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:15(IV)(a) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(mm)(3)(a)
(West Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(3) (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-4.1(a)(5)(ii)
(1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-21-30(8)(c)(i) (Law. Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-
602(f)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503(b)(2)(A) (1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-96.7(A)(1) (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 5-1 1A-8(b)(2)(C) (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 106.04(5m)(a)(le)(a) (1997).
203. Since the Housing for Older Persons Act was enacted, five states have amended their fair
housing laws to conform to the relaxed federal standards. See Act of July 18, 1996, No. 89-520,
§5, 1996 I11. Legis. Serv. 2253, 2254-55 (West) (codified at 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-106(I)
(West Supp. 1997)); Act of Apr. 11, 1997, ch. 85, 1997 Me. Legis. Serv. 669 (West) (codified at
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4581(2)(C) (West Supp. 1997)); Act of Apr. 2, 1997, ch. 194, 1997
Mont. Laws 194 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305(10) (1997)); Act of June 9, 1997, ch.
235, 1997 Or. Laws 235 (to be codified at OR. REv. STAT. § 659.033); Act of May 16, 1997, ch.
400, § 3, 1997 Wash. Legis. Serv. 1783, 1787-88 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.222(6) (West Supp. 1998)). In addition, the Wisconsin Assembly passed a bill that would
amend Wisconsin Statutes § 106.04(5m)(a)(le)(a) to eliminate the "significant facilities and
services" requirement. See H.R. 46, 93d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1997). The bill is currently
awaiting action by the Wisconsin Senate. This legislation is in keeping with a general trend
among state fair housing laws to maintain parity with federal standards. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 11,
1997, ch. 85, 1997 Me. Legis. Serv. 669 (West) (captioned "An Act to Conform State Laws
Regarding Fair Housing for Older Persons with Federal Laws"). In fact, the fair housing laws of
seven states specifically provide that housing for older persons shall be evaluated according to
Federal standards. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955.9(b)(2)-(3) (Deering Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46a-64b(6) (West 1995); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 501-231(b)(1) (Michie Supp.
1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.365(3) (Michie Supp. 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B,
§ 20(l)(I)(iv) (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305(10)(c) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.222(6) (West Supp. 1998). Of these, the California definition is particularly intriguing in
that it specifically provides that the California exemption shall be equivalent to that provided in
the FHAA and implementing regulations, without reference to amendments. See CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12955.9(b)(2)-(3) (Deering Supp. 1997). Thus far, it appears that no California court has
determined whether the Housing for Older Persons Act operates to alter the scope of the senior
exemption under the California statute.
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specifically permits states to provide protection equal to or greater than
that provided by the Fair Housing Act; 204 thus, states are free to retain
the family-friendly "significant facilities and services" requirement of
the FHAA. Those states that retain this requirement should evaluate it
on the merits, and not eliminate it solely to maintain parity with federal
standards.
If the "significant facilities and services" requirement is retained,
some mechanism should be established to prevent suits under the fair
housing laws from crippling housing providers. One recently suggested
possibility, is pre-certification of senior communities.2 °5 Under a varia-
tion on this mechanism, a condominium or other housing development
intending to qualify for the senior housing exemption would submit a
draft charter and facilities plan to HUD or to a competent state agency.
That agency would then approve or disapprove the application for fifty-
five-and-over exemption status. Approval would establish the facility's
status as a senior community without resort to costly and potentially
disastrous litigation. A pre-certification statute could also provide for a
rebuttable presumption that any complex receiving agency approval
complies with the statute, placing the burden of proof on the aggrieved
party to show that the community does not meet statutory
requirements.2 °6
If such a mechanism were enacted at the state level in conjunction
with clearly-defined "significant facilities and services" regulations sim-
ilar to those promulgated by HUD in 1995, then families with children
would be protected from discrimination while seniors would still be
assured of affordable housing with amenities suited to their needs. The
anti-discrimination aim of the FHAA would be met, and seniors, and
senior communities, would be able to enjoy the convenience of adult
housing without the inconvenience of murky statutory provisions and
the constant threat of lawsuits.
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1994). It is noteworthy that at least one state fair housing law
contains no senior housing exemption at all. See Theresa M. Beiner, An Overview of the Arkansas
Civil Rights Act of 1993, 50 ARK. L. REV. 165, 212 (1997).
205. Elena R. Minicucci, Note, Housing for Older Persons Exemption in the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988: Can Mr. Wilson Really Stop Dennis the Menace from Moving in Next
Door?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 761, 790-92 (1995).
206. This would change the existing allocation of the burden of proof in federal fair housing
litigation, under which the defendant must prove compliance with the statutory requirements. See
Simovits v. Chanticleer Condominium Ass'n, 933 F. Supp. 1394, 1401 (N.D. I11. 1996).
Reallocating the burden of proof would be a fair means of removing some of the burdens of
litigation from housing communities making good-faith efforts to comply with fair housing
statutes. In addition to being consistent with the ordinary rule which places the burden of proof on
the plaintiff in civil cases.
1998]
